Ukrainianization, terror and famine: coverage in Lviv’s Dilo and the nationalist press of the 1930s

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The years 1932-34 were a turning point in Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalism was declared the “greatest danger,” replacing Russian great-power chauvinism which had held this distinction since the Twelfth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) in 1923. Pavel Postyshev arrived from Moscow to implement the new line, which was that Ukrainianization had hitherto been a “Petliurite” operation aimed at developing a national culture and state, instead of being a tool for bolshevization (See Martin 356, 362-68). Sweeping arrests and show trials were conducted in order to intimidate those who were conducting Ukrainianization and to make the republic completely subservient to the party centre in Moscow. By the late thirties, korenizatsiia (the policy of rooting bolshevik rule in local populations) was seen as best done through Russification, and not through cooperation with supporters of a national renaissance that, in Stalin’s view, had interfered with the strengthening of bolshevik power (Iefimenko 13). After gaining control of the party and crushing the Ukrainian peasantry, Stalin began undermining Ukrainianization by linking it to nationalism and the disasters of collectivization. An incorrect, “Petliurite” Ukrainianization, it was pronounced, had stimulated resistance to party policies, caused shortages in grain-requisitioning and led to revolts. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party stated on December 14, 1932, that a lack of “bolshevik vigilance” had allowed “the twisting of the party line” (Ibid. 24). Countless underground “Petliurite” organizations were uncovered by the GPU. In July 1933 the rhetoric escalated as these organizations were linked to national deviationists within the Ukrainian party.
By 1937, Ukrainianization had been dropped and nationalism was even blamed for introducing minority languages into schools. *Visti VUTsVK* reported in an editorial on September 4, 1937 that the “subversive” work had been led by “the main trusted fascist spies, all kinds of Liubchenkos and Khvylia.” Panas Liubchenko and Andrii Khvylia were prominent party figures, and, ironically, in the twenties and thirties had been leading critics of “nationalist” deviations in Ukraine. Liubchenko committed suicide in 1937 and Khvylia disappeared in the purges in the same year.

Although the rhetoric in favour of Ukrainianization continued after 1932, it masked the real goal of reigning in and removing those who believed in cultural distinctiveness and national statehood, an approach that Shapoval has called “double book-keeping” (Shapoval 26). A violent “militant bolshevik” writing denounced sabotage and resistance by “Petliurites,” “bourgeois nationalists” and “kulaks.” Pavlo Tychyna’s “Partiia vede” (The Party Leads, 1933) and Leonid Pervomaisky’s poems glorifying the Osnaz (special forces, often charged with putting down revolts) are perhaps the most notorious examples. The point of view of the victimized would only be made available after the war in works by writers like Teodosii Osmachka and Vasyl Barka.

These events were, however, commented upon at the time in Polish-ruled Galicia and in the Ukrainian émigré communities of Prague, Vienna, Berlin, Paris and Warsaw. Yurii Klen (Oswald Burghardt), who was allowed to emigrate in 1932 owing to his German background, contributed both poetry and journalism to the Lviv *Vistnyk* (Herald) and other publications. Vitalii Yurchenko (real name Holynsky), who found employment in Galicia as an inspector of community cooperatives, vividly described the experience of Ukrainianization, bolshevik terror, collectivization, imprisonment and escape from Solovki in *Shliakhmy na Solovky (Iz zapysok*
zaslantsia) (1931), Zi Solovetskoho pekla na voliu (1931), Peklo na zemli (V usevloni OGPU – Na Solovkakh) (1932). Iryna Narizhna in her Prague anthology Nastroi (Moods, 1933) included a poem which depicted famine and cannibalism. At the beginning of the thirties, 60,000 Galicians were working in Soviet Ukraine as part of the Ukrainianization movement; some were able to transfer information across the border (Zięba, Lobbing 295).

Interwar Poland contained the largest Ukrainian community outside the Soviet Union. There were over five million Ukrainians in Galicia, Volhynia and Polisia, of whom 30,000 were political refugees from the 1917-20 struggle for independence. The terror and Great Famine of 1932-33 were widely reported in the Galician Ukrainian press, and had a dramatic impact throughout Western Ukraine and the émigré communities. The fullest coverage was in the largest Ukrainian newspaper outside the Soviet Union, Dilo, a Lviv daily and a beacon of democratic journalism in troubled times. In the summer of 1933, as the famine’s scope became clear, a number of figures in the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU) publicized their break with the organization on the newspaper’s pages. At the same time the radical form of nationalism associated with the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) was gathering strength, a development that was also reported with alarm by the newspaper. Historians have indentified the main reasons for the OUN’s growth in the weakness of Polish democracy and the country’s inability to deal with the national question (Motyka 73). Like the wider Ukrainian society, the OUN voiced grievances against the Polonization campaign and against the government’s refusal to implement the autonomy that it had promised in 1919-23 when, under international agreements, it had been allowed to establish an administration in Galicia. However, the news of unfolding disasters in Soviet Ukraine also influenced attitudes in Western Ukraine.
The OUN’s agitation called for the establishment of an independent state on all territories with a majority Ukrainian population, which meant primarily adjacent lands under Soviet, Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovakian rule. The communists also called for a revolution that would unify this Ukrainian population and give it full national rights. The CPWU membership, which was predominantly Ukrainian and Jewish, used the national and land question to attract Ukrainians. As a result, as Timothy Snyder has pointed out (82), was that its propagandists became articulators of Ukrainian nationalism. The two radical movements had grown out of the same soil. Volodymyr Martynets, one of the OUN’s leading ideologists, has written that this generation emerged from the “Sturm und Drang” period of the early twenties: “It was a time when I, a nationalist, could for several weeks (on my own) give talks in the communist student Hromada (Collective), arguing the absurdity and unreality of communist concepts. But is this, in fact, so strange when one considers that these communists fought for Ukrainian post-secondary schools in Lviv alongside others in the common anti-Polish front?” (Ukrainske pidpillia 20). He felt that this generation shared the same wartime and postwar experiences, and often found a common language more quickly than “likeminded” party members. News of the disasters in Ukraine were therefore an ideological blow to the CPWU and a potential benefit to the OUN in the competition for the hearts and minds of Galicians.

The communist press described the Polish regime as “fascist” and supported the use of terrorism against it. Soviet journals claimed that in fact the CPWU was leading the national liberation struggle, and that the OUN was merely surfing a wave of legitimate revolutionary anger. In an article from 1929 the Kyiv journal Bilshovyk Ukrainy (Bolshevik of Ukraine) called for educating the masses “in a spirit of proletarian nationalism” (Bratkovskyi 84). However, the CPWU suffered setbacks at this time: in 1928 there was an internal revolt against the Soviet
nationalities policy, and then news of collectivization and the Great Famine (described in Ukraine today at the Holodomor) began affecting its Ukrainian base. The party was eventually dissolved in 1938. The OUN, by contrast, was able to present itself as the only viable radical alternative. This struggle of nationalists against communists is particularly prominent in the fiction of Ulas Samchuk, a leading interwar prose writer and OUN sympathiser. Disillusionment with communism and conversion to nationalism play important roles in his *Mesnyky* (Avengers, 1931-32) and *Kulak* (1929-35; as a separate book 1937). The Great Famine is depicted in the novel *Maria* (1934, 1952), one of his most successful books. However, this event received less exposure in the OUN’s press than one might expect. There are several reasons for this.

For one thing, the Famine was widely publicized by the press of moderate (liberal and democratic) nationalists. The daily *Dilo* was edited by Vasyl Mudry, a member of the Polish parliament (Sejm) and the leader of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO). This party held over twenty seats in the Sejm after the election of 1928. It supported autonomy for Galicia within Poland, and wished to see Soviet Ukraine become an independent state with a parliamentary democracy and equal rights for all minorities and religious groups. The newspaper devoted extensive coverage to the Pacification campaign of 1930, during which the Polish military and police beat hundreds of people (several of whom died as a result) and destroyed the property of many individuals and institutions. According to official sources 450 villages were surrounded either by the police or army, told to pay contributions, and then punished when the money was not produced. Often the fact that someone subscribed to a Ukrainian newspaper or sent their child to a Ukrainian school was the pretext for violence (Smolii 550). Yuliian Holovinsky, the OUN leader in Galicia, was murdered, and many institutions were closed down, including cooperatives, Prosvita branches, the scouting organization Plast, and the sporting
organizations Luh and Sokil. The Pacification campaign was a response to the wave of arsons that had targeted Polish property earlier that year. They had been initiated by the OUN’s leadership, but had been taken up by various groups. Soviet commentators claimed that the arsons were the work of communists. One observer has suggested that in reality as many as half were done by the estate owners themselves in order to collect government insurance, while responsibility for the other half could probably be divided evenly between the OUN and the communists (Petryshyn 22).

*Dilo* consistently denounced not only the Pacification campaign but also the OUN’s terrorism. A turning point was reached in 1932 when the botched raid on the post office in Horodok caused the death of two postal workers and led to the hanging of two students, Dmytro Danylyshyn and Vasyl Bilas. Along with other newspapers like the Catholic *Meta, Dilo* condemned the act. The OUN was also censured for abetting students who jeered and stoned the Ukrainian Youth for Christ (Ukrainska Molod Khrystovi) parades during the first week of May, 1933 (“Zhertvy naivnosti chy provokatsiia? Shche z pryvodu protyrelihiinoi demonstratsii chastyny ukraiinskoi molodi,” *Dilo*, 5 May 1933). The OUN periodical *Nash klych* (Our Call) had taken a lenient line toward the disruptions and the resulting outcry was seen as a strong condemnation of the Nationalists. Although some student resolutions urged boycotting the gatherings, the large demonstrations and parades of May 6 and 7 showed that public support was with the church. As a result organizers of the boycott backed off and this action was not repeated. The conflict was discussed by Mudry and Vladimir Kisilewsky of the Ukrainian Bureau in London, who wrote articles for *Dilo* and visited Lviv in 1933. Mudry felt that the Youth for Christ fiasco “could lead to a crisis and decline of the Nationalists” (Kaye, 3 May 1933).
However, Dilo’s journalists were aware of a deeper problem. One commentator wrote that belief in a violent Social Darwinism was capturing young people (Roman Gotsky, “Ruinnytskyi instynkt,” Dilo, 3 May 1933). Another warned against placing the nation above God. People, he wrote, are the highest value, and not all means are justifiable and ethical (Mykola Konrad, “Tserkva i natsionalism,” Dilo, 4 May 1933). A third discussed why youth found authoritarianism attractive: “The main reason is that we live among undemocratic states and slogans. Willy-nilly we submit to overly strong foreign influences, and become infected with dubious pseudo-democrats, who are especially plentiful among our neighbours.” Democracy, he argued, tries to regulate relations between individuals and national groups. Whenever a middle class is lacking or weak and the possibility for social advancement is not available authoritarianism grows (M. Tvorydlo, “Demokratyzm chy avtorytaryzm?” Dilo, 3 January 1933).

The most direct attacks on the OUN came from Mudry and Volodymyr Tselevych, the secretary of UNDO and editor of the party’s official organ Svoboda (Freedom). Kisilewsky writes that in January, 1933, Mudry spoke to him of the irresponsibility of Nationalist youth, and “the creation in Galicia of something akin to the Irish ‘gunmen’ who are beginning to terrorize the Ukrainian community.” An assassination attempt had been planned against him for his article in Dilo condemning the attack on the post office in Horodok (Kaye 13 January 1933). Tselevych spoke out against the OUN at many gatherings. In 1933 he published a series of articles condemning terrorist tactics (V. Tselevych. “Ne mozhna movchaty,” Dilo, 3 June 1933 and “Treba protydiaty” Dilo, 17 June 1933; “Ti, shcho vnosiat khaos v ukraintske zhyttia,” Dilo, 25 June 1933; “Shkidlyvi sabotazhnyky,” Dilo, 11 October 1933). Some young people, he argued, were beginning to believe that the end justifies the means, and this amoral attitude was affecting all aspects of political and civil life. The youth were reading Dontsov, he said, but not analyzing
him, and as a result his *Natsionalizm* (Nationalism, 1926) had poisoned minds. Moreover, the legal and illegal literature of the OUN had not been challenged in the press, except for the occasional comment about “the absurd thesis of the so-called revolutionary ideology” (V. Tselevych, “Treba protydiiaty” *Dilo*, 17 June 1933). Tselevych, like his fellow-journalist Zenon Pelensky (not to be confused with Zynovii Pelensky, a Ukrainian member of the Sejm), had themselves belonged to the underground UVO (Ukrainian Military Organization), which had conducted acts of sabotage and assassinations in the twenties and which in 1929 became part of the OUN. By the thirties both had become prominent supporters of democratic forms of struggle and opponents of terrorism.

When the *Kurier Lwowski* (Lviv Courier), an organ of the Polish nationalist Endeks (National Democrats) attempted to throw responsibility for terrorism onto the whole Ukrainian community, *Dilo* replied that the origin of the problem lay in the Polish laws and nationality policy, which provided the soil in which terrorism grew. Polish nationalism, wrote *Dilo*, thought that the terrorists could “never be satisfied,” and that any gains would be used to demand more. The newspaper answered that this position “rejects a priori the rights of Ukrainians to a legal, evolutionary struggle” within the state and was a way of telling Ukrainians that they could expect no further political gains. The OUN, said the newspaper, “does not hang in the stratosphere” but arose in social-cultural circumstances that make youth into material for the OUN: “When these sources dry up, it will become more difficult to draw youth into revolutionary work” (“Iaku garantiiu ‘Dilo’ daie v imeni OUN? Vidhuk endetskoho ‘Kuriera Lvivskoho’ na stattiu ‘Dila’,” *Dilo*, 4 November 1933).

*Dilo* therefore made a distinction between “nationalism” as the legitimate defence of a nation and its interests, and “Nationalism” as the ideology and tactics of the OUN. It argued that
the violence that occurs during war and in acts of self-defence is impermissible in peacetime. As for terrorism against one’s own community, Tselevych wrote: “nationalism has never, anywhere used these methods of struggle” (“Ne mozhna movchaty,” Dilo, 3 June 1933). This position made the newspaper’s condemnation of Soviet terror credible and effective.

_Dilo_ had earlier praised the Soviet Ukraine’s successes in film, theatre and scholarship. While generally positive, this coverage criticized the “planetary” (namely, imperialistic) views of Russians concerning Ukraine (“Realizatory nationalnoi spravedlyvosti,” Dilo 22 July 1927). It followed closely the censuring of Oleksandr Shumsky and Mykola Khvylovy, who championed a faster pace of Ukrainianization in the twenties. The issue of Ukrainianization resonated in Galicia, because, not only had the Polish government reneged on promises given to Western powers that autonomy would be given to Eastern Galicia, but Ukrainians found themselves excluded from universities and government jobs, witnessed the closing of their schools, the levelling of their churches, and attacks on their organizations. They equated their own struggles against Polonization with resistance to Russification in Soviet Ukraine.

The watershed moment appears to have come in 1933, when Soviet policy turned decisively against Ukrainianization and news of the famine spread. Both Mykola Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, two figures who were emblematic of the Ukrainian cultural “renaissance” of 1923-33, committed suicide. Within months, prominent figures in the CPWU made public statements and quit the party, leaving it more closely identified with its Polish and Jewish membership. Stepan Volynets, a former member of the Sejm for the Sel-Rob party (Ukrainian Peasant and Workers Socialist Alliance, a legal wing of the communists), published a letter of protest against Moscow’s nationality policy, mentioning that the suicides of Skrypnyk and Khvylovy had spurred him to break with his former colleagues (“Holos sumlinnia,” Dilo, 26 July 1933).
Another article quoted Shumsky’s words that “the Russian communist rules in the party,” and explained that the rusotiapy (unconsciously prejudiced pro-Russians) were now again ascendant in the CP(b)U (B.M., “Trahediia ukrainstva v USRR,” Dilo, 12 July 1933). One writer insisted that the nationalities politics of the USSR was merely a “chess move” and that all along Moscow had continued to view Ukraine as a colony or province. Much of the bureaucracy had remained non-Ukrainian and after biding its time was now turning against the local population (“Polityka bezprijikladnoho khuzhatstva,” Dilo, 10 September 1933). Particularly important in the Galician context were the attacks on Shumsky and former members of the CPWU like Mykhailo Maksymovych, who were familiar to the population there. Equally eloquent was the suicide on August 3, 1933, of Mykola Stronsky, a secretary of the Soviet consulate in Lviv, who had fought for independence with the Ukrainian Sich Riflement and the Ukrainian Galician Army. One former communist wrote a personal letter of recantation in which he likened Moscow’s politics to absolutism, described Ukraine’s treatment as a crime against national liberation struggles everywhere, and stated that behind the internationalist facade lay the “national chauvinism of the dominant Russian [Moskovska] nation” (“Nedavnii komunist kaietsia,” Dilo, 13 September 1933).

The fate of the Krushelnytskys, the most prominent Sovietophile family in Galicia, shocked all of Western Ukraine. Antin Krushelnytsky and almost his entire family had moved to Kharkiv on May 8, 1934, to participate in the Ukrainianization movement. They had been seen off at the Lviv railway station by a large crowd. All were arrested on November 7. The two sons Ivan and Taras were part of the twenty-eight immediately executed. Dilo printed the text of the sentence in large type on the front page of its December 22, 1934 issue, listing the names the writers to be shot. The other Krushelnytsky family members were executed in the Gulag in 1937;
Antin died there in 1941. A resolute enemy of the OUN, he had edited the journals *Novy shliakhy* (New Paths, 1928-32) and *Krytyka* (Criticism, 1933), which had been closed by the Polish government, along with all other Sovietophile publications. The accusation that the family were agents of the OUN and complicit in the murder of Kirov were patently ridiculous and caused a sensation in the Ukrainian and Polish press.

Equally absurd were the allegations against Skrypnyk. One of them was that he had hired 1,500 teachers from Western Ukraine as part of a group sent by “international imperialism” (Hetmanchuk 125). Another Galician communist, Fedir Konar (also known as Palashchuk), who had risen to the position of deputy head of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture was executed for working for foreign powers. He confessed to having been a spy for thirteen years (M.O., “Chekisty y monarkhisty,” *Dilo*, 29 September 1933). His trial was incongruously linked to the arrest and execution of thirty-five “sabotagers and spies” at Metropolitan-Vickers, a British engineering firm. At this time one British engineer had reported back to England that there were starving people in his apartment block, and that one person had died outside his door. Soviet authorities were, of course, infuriated by any such attempts to spread abroad news of famine. Postyshev was reported in *Dilo* as saying that all Ukrainians were spies.

UNDO had in 1930 played a leading role in protesting the Pacification; it now did the same concerning the famine. Although the émigré OUN supported some of these publicity efforts, it could not play a significant role because its terrorist activities effectively excluded it from mainstream politics. Some in the OUN leadership within Galicia even rejected these efforts to gain publicity, seeing them as serving only to spread an illusory faith in democracy and “parliamentary” procedures. The organization’s support, however, began to grow at this time,
probably boosted by outrage at events in Soviet Ukraine, and by frustration with Western
democracies, who appeared unwilling or unable to act.

Already in the winter of 1931-32 there had been newspaper reports of famine in Soviet
Ukraine. An estimated 150,000 people died and numerous individuals had escaped across the
border to Romania and Poland. There were descriptions of people being shot while attempting
the crossing. The Romanian government and British parliamentarians expressed their concern in
the press. Ukrainians in the bordering countries protested the forcible return of the many
refugees, who faced immediate execution. As a result of this publicity, in the first half of 1933
the Soviet Union heavily reinforced the border to prevent similar escapes in the future. It cleared
much of the local population from the border areas and inserted a large number of Russian troops
-- action that have been seen by some as evidence that the regime already foresaw the possibility
of another famine as a result of its policies (Papuha, Zakhidna 33).

Newspaper coverage of the Great Famine of 1932-33 began in the latter part of 1932 and
went through several phases. Initially it was only reported through letters describing hard times.
Jewish colonists told of persecution and arrests, and their survival with some scant help from
abroad, or their exile to Kazakhstan (“Zhydy u sovitakh,” Dilo, 26 Nov 1932). The coverage
began to include stories translated from Western newspapers, which were considered
authoritative and often had access to well-informed sources. The story of these Jewish colonists,
for example, was taken from the Vienna paper Nation und Staat. Initially the extent of the famine
appeared incredible and readers might have viewed some reports as exaggerated. A number of
articles tried to explain the unaccountable phenomenon of a bountiful harvest being exported
while the population was allowed to starve. Moreover, there were bold-faced denials. At this
time Gareth Jones’ “Will there be soup?” (Western Mail, 17 October 1932) was countered with
“France: Herriot a Mother” (*Time*, 31 October 1932). It was not until the spring of 1933 that Jones warned of the enormity of what was taking place in his “Famine grips Russia” (*New York Evening Post*, 30 March 1933). This report was immediately answered the following day by Walter Duranty’s mendacious “Russians Hungry, but not Starving” (*New York Times*, 31 March 1933). One Ukrainian, who had returned to the USA from a visit to Ukraine, spoke of the planned destruction of his former homeland. He insisted that there were many Jews and sons of former estate managers among the higher commissars and suggested that they were taking revenge on Ukrainian villagers because these had been hostile toward Jews during the revolution when land had been taken away from landowners. He warned of a cataclysm because no one had a chance against the well-fed Red Army and there could be no hope for Soviet mercy (“Bezposeredni visty z Radianskoi Ukrainy,” *Dilo*, 4 February 1933).

It should be mentioned that the coverage in *Dilo* was not generally antisemitic. The paper occasionally printed sympathetic accounts of Jews who were victims of crimes. It also covered Zionist conferences and mentioned events in the Jewish community. When the New York congressman Hamilton Fish spoke out on May 25 against the treatment of Jews in Germany, this was reported. Fish also condemned the communist party for preaching class hatred, the destruction of religious communities and private ownership. He did not deny that Jews played a role in German communism but stated that this in no way made 600,000 German Jews guilty (“Zhyd osterihaie zhydiv pered bilshovyzmom (“Korespondentsiia z Ameryky,” *Dilo*, 14 June 1933).

By May-June of 1933 reports were streaming in of a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. Readers were informed that millions were dying, while the heavy military presence at the border prevented desperate people from escaping to neighbouring countries (Stepan Baran,
“Z nashoi trahedii za Zbruchem,” *Dilo*, 21 May 1933. A letter from Ukraine mentioned “the best people” being arrested and charged retrospectively with having participated in the armies of Denikin or Petliura. It spoke of food confiscations and starvation rations (“Nuzhda i holod na Ukraini,” *Dilo*, 18 June 1933). This was followed by a letter to a brother outside the USSR describing dying family members and pleading for help (“Z krainy nuzhdy i holodu,” *Dilo*, 23 June 1933). As the evidence piled up, it was confirmed by information translated from Western European and North American newspapers. In some cases the foreign press coverage was summarized, with brief quotations from different sources (“V oboroni vmyraiuchoi Ukrainy,” *Dilo*, 25 June 1933; “Vidhuky holodu na Radianskii Ukraini v evropeiskii presi,” *Dilo*, 30 August 1933). Among the more powerful indictments, one could mention Gareth Jones’ interview in the *New York American* (“V oboroni vmyraiuchohi Ukrainy,” *Dilo*, 25 June 1933), and two letters to *Le Matin* from the North Caucasus and Black Sea region (“Maten’ pro holod u S.R.S.R.,” *Dilo*, 2 October 1933). Jones’s article appeared on March 31, and Bertillon’s on August 29, which suggests a delay of at least a month between the appearance of the article in the West and its publication in Ukrainian translation. The more frequently referenced foreign newspapers were *Neue Zuricher Zeitung, Kolnischer Zeitung, Le Matin, Manchester Guardian, Daily Telegraph* and *Catholic Herald*. Quotations from the English press were particularly vivid and effective. The Ukrainian Bureau in London, which was run by Kisilewsky, played an important role in providing *Dilo* with information and translations of British coverage. The *Christian Science Monitor* was reported as writing on September 7 that some people had been eating only weeds and tree bark for months. The *Yorkshire Observer* was reported as saying on September 14 that anyone who wanted to know what real persecution was like should travel through Ukraine. It was a state in which people really were shot for taking a few grains of wheat,
which they themselves had sown in their own field. They were being executed not by a few fanatics, but legally and officially by the regime. These reports appeared in *Dilo* only ten days after their publication in Britain (“Anhliiska presa pro holod na Ukraini,” *Dilo*, 17 September 1933).

One reporter tried to read the scale of the tragedy by analyzing the Soviet press (M. Danko, “Dyktatura holodu,” *Dilo*, 29 June 1933). Based on his reading of *Izvestia* from 5, 8 and 9 September he wrote that hungry children were being mobilized to guard granaries and to denounce their parents to the GPU (the Soviet secret police) when these were found stealing grain. The testimony of a German visitor described the presence in Moscow of many peasants who had escaped from Ukraine and were begging for bread (“Holod na Ukraini,” *Dilo*, 13 September 1933).

Other Galician papers also carried information, especially *Svoboda* (Freedom), *Nova zoria* (New Star), *Ukrainska nyva* (Ukrainian Field), *Meta* (Goal), *Nedilia* (Sunday), *Novyi chas* (New Time), *Nove selo* (New Village), *Nash klych* (Our Call) and *Za Ukrainu* (For Ukraine). The last, whose first issue appeared on October 1, 1933, was specially created to carry new of the disaster (Papuha 17, 19-21). As major Western newspapers began to speak insistently of the event and scores of refugees arrived despite the tight border controls (between twenty and fifty managed to escape each month during 1933), Galician society began a coordinated mobilization. On July 25 an aid group (Ukrainskyi Hromadskyi Komitet Riatunku Ukrainy, Ukrainian Civil Committee for Saving Ukraine) was formed at an UNDO conference. The leadership included the parliamentarians Vasyl Mudry, Milena Rudnytska, Zynovii Pelensky and Volodymyr Tselevych. It began spreading information and issued an appeal urging all people to speak up about the disaster (“Byimo na velykyi dzvin na tryvohu!” *Dilo*, 14 August 1933). On July 28,
1933, *Dilo* published a series of articles from the European press on the famine. One, by Ewald Ammende, the General Secretary of the European Congress for Nationalities in Vienna, outlined what had happened and described the hundreds of letters he was receiving daily. He mentioned Gareth Jones’ reporting and described what was occurring as a war both against the peasantry and separatism. He thought that the antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians had called forth a reaction against the “cultural desires of Ukraine,” and lamented the fact that while surplus grain was being burned in Kansas, no help was being given to the starving (“Holod na Ukraini,” 28 July, *Dilo* 1933). At this point other articles from the foreign press had become available and were translated, among them Malcolm Muggeridge’s piece “The Soviets’ War on the Peasants,” which had appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* 39 (May 1933): 558-64 (“Strakhittia na Ukraini,” *Dilo*, 6 August 1933). The reporting of foreign press coverage also mentioned denials, such those by Walter Duranty and the scoffing by *Izvestia* (Moscow) on July 20 at “idiotic provocation.”

The CPWU continually denied the famine throughout this period, claiming that the reports were part of war preparations by Western powers, that they were the writings of insane people and so on (Papuha, *Zakhidna* 83-84).

It was, however, only in late August and early September that the press reported a large-scale and coordinated response in Galician society. The Ukrainian Catholic Church put out an appeal over the signature of the Metropolitan Andrii Sheptytsky for prayers and active engagement (“Ukraina v peredsmertnykh sudorohakh,” *Dilo*, 27 July 1933). Another appeal urged that meetings be summoned throughout Western Ukraine and committees elected to organize protests and days of mourning, to collect money for relief, and to inform society at large and Ukrainians throughout the world. This call was signed by all Ukrainian parliamentary representatives and thirty-four community organizations on August 30, 1933 (“Komitety
riatunku Ukrainy,” *Dilo*, 1 Sept. 33). Groups throughout Galicia raised funds and attempted to send help, either in the form of food or money. These were often hindered by Soviet authorities, mainly by inflating costs and the exchange rate for money. In any case the help when it got through could benefit only very few (Papuha, *Zakhidna* 110-118). The Soviets also made it known that some individuals would be allowed to emigrate but that a large fee would be charged (Papuha, “Vysvitlennia” 31). Protest actions spread throughout Western Ukraine in an attempt to stir Western governments to action (Papuha, *Zakhidna* 131-234).

The first statistical evidence appears to have been presented in late August (“Statystyka Holodovoi smerty,” *Dilo* 23 August 1933). It showed that thousands had died in specific villages, and gave graphic descriptions of cannibalism, mentioning, for example, that burials of the recently deceased were forbidden, because “fresh” corpses were being dug up and eaten. A more systematic reporting of the information that had become available in Western newspapers began in September (M. Danko’s “Evropeiska aktsiia proty holodu v Ukraini, *Dilo* 3 September 1933; “Strashne lykholittia naselennia na Ukraini,” *Dilo*, 6 September 1933). A translation was printed of an eyewitness report that had appeared in *Le Matin* (Paris) on August 30, 1933. This was a moving description by Marta Stebalo, a woman who had emigrated from Ukraine fifteen years ago and had returned in July as an American tourist. She travelled via Moscow and Leningrad to Kyiv, from where she visited several neighbouring villages. The translation appeared twelve days after the original report (“Polityka bezprikladnoho khzyzhatstva,” *Dilo*, 11 September 1933). By September 11 the figure of three to four million deaths was being presented. However, in the absence of reliable information, various estimates concerning the number of dead were circulating. In October Berlin sources were cited as receiving information from the Soviet Union that six million had died, or around fifteen percent of the population of
Ukraine. These sources added that about nine million people in all had been displaced by the catastrophe and that “a commission had been created to colonize the empty spaces with Russians and Jews.” The Soviet authorities, it was said, privately admitted to two million dead (“Les Kurbas pide na sud za ‘ukhyly’,” Dilo, 18 October 1933). It is likely that this information had come from Otto Schiller, the German Cultural Attache in Moscow, who was relaying information back to Berlin, which then shared it with other Western governments. Germany was following the news closely. Its embassy had already been besieged since the fall of 1929 by Germans, mainly Mennonites, who spoke of the horrors of collectivization and were desperate to leave (Martin 319-20). Moreover, the German population of the Volga also suffered badly from famine in 1932-33.

The aid committee continued to issue protests, to coordinate the actions of other groups and to issue publications. It wrote to President Rooseveldt asking for diplomatic pressure to be applied on Moscow. It issued appeals, drawing attention to the fact that hunger and terror were raging throughout Ukraine and the Kuban, that foreign correspondents were prevented from entering the areas, and that large-scale deportations to forced labour camps in Siberia and the Arctic were occurring. These events threatened to “erase the Ukrainian nation from the face of the earth” (“Do kulturnoho svitu!” Dilo, 14 September 1933). Ukrainian socialist and social-democratic parties issued their own declaration, and protested against the arrests, executions and the export of food (“Ukrainski sotialisty pro lykholittia Ukrainy,” Dilo, 13 September 1933).

An appeal to women of all nations to protest “the cruel treatment of the defenceless” appeared in mid-September. It informed that thousands of letters had come from starving people, that the famine was accompanied by the destruction of Ukrainian autonomy and the conduct of monstrous show-trials: “All this is occurring in front of the civilized world’s silence. Only in the
last while have the Christian churches in several European countries raised their voices in protest and the desire to help. Responsible people in government remain quiet. Filing away the recently-signed ‘pacts of non-aggression’ with the bolsheviks and commercial agreements (which among other things are concerned with the bloody grain of Ukraine), they turn a blind eye to ‘the internal affairs’ of ‘friendly countries’, maintain a loyal silence and await the end of the bolshevik experiment” (“Do zhinotstva kulturnoho svitu,” Dilo, 14 September 1933). The letter represented an indirect attack on the Polish government, which had signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932.

Although the Polish Kurier Warzawski had reported that people who had died of hunger were lying on the streets of Kyiv and that hundred of orphans were roaming the land, Dilo informed that only on October 23, 1933, did Kurier describe the extent of the catastrophe and warn that the same scenario could be repeated in the following year. A contemporary researcher has written that the Ukrainian campaign “did not receive understanding in Polish society” (Kushnezh, “Uchast” 138). The Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny wrote on the same day: “Under the pretext of saving their brothers in Soviet Ukraine, the Ukrainian press began an anti-Soviet politics” (quoted in ibid.) Dilo put the Polish silence down to the “Sovietophile mania” that had taken hold following the signing of a Polish-Soviet pact and complained that even the Catholic bishops had not let their voices be heard. The newspaper indicated that the French had also signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in the same year but their press had not hesitated to speak out about what was occurring (“Prolomana Polska movchanka pro holod v USRR,” Dilo, 26 October 1933). The Polish administration banned public demonstrations in Lviv on October 24, 1933, during a day of solidarity with the people in Ukraine. Instead the organizers were limited to conducting church services and holding lectures.
The international response began to gather strength in August. A delegation that included two Ukrainian members of the Polish Sejm, Milena Rudnytska and Zynovii Pelensky, and two Bukovinian parliamentary representatives, Volodymyr Zalozetsky and Yurii Serbeniuk, travelled to Geneva to meet with delegates to the Congress of European Nationalities. It then met the President of the League of Nations, Johan Mowinckel, the Prime Minister of Norway, shortly before the League’s September session. He agreed to take up the matter, even though it was not on the agenda. The League expressed its shock at hearing the details, and its solidarity with Ukrainians and the people who continued to suffer in the USSR. In spite of Mowinckel’s urging, the League’s Council declined to raise the matter directly with the Soviet Union, but decided to send the collected information to the Red Cross and to inform the USSR of this action. The Liaison Committee of International Women’s Organization had earlier supported discussion of the matter in the League and had published a letter over the signature of Margaret Corbett Ashby. The Ukrainian delegation left pleased that at least the facts of the famine had been accepted. Dilo reported that Mowinckel had given an interview to *Le Matin* on October 1 (“Holova Rady Ligy Natsii u spravi holodu na Radianskii Ukraini,” *Dilo* 10 October 1933). At this same time the Ukrainian Bureau in London organized a meeting with British parliamentarians and various humanitarian organizations (“Holod na Radianskii Ukraini,” *Dilo*, 8 October 1933).

Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had already spoken out about the catastrophe. On August 19 he had written a letter which appeared throughout the Austrian press under the title “To the Christian World! Appeal by Cardinal and Archbishop of Vienna” (“Kardinal Innitzer ruft die Welt gegen den Hungertod auf,” *Reichspost*, 20 August 1933). On his journey back to Lviv, Zynovii Pelensky visited the Cardinal in Vienna and informed him of what had happened at the
League of Nations. *Dilo* reported that the Cardinal was pleased with the de facto international recognition (“Holod na Ukraini u opinii svita (Z rozmovy z pos. Z. Pelenskym),” *Dilo*, 12 October 1933). Soon after this Innitzer called an inter-faith gathering of church leaders and spoke to them of the famine’s horrors. A series of actions were planned and public communiqués were issued (St., “Orhanizatsiia dopomohy holoduiuchym na Ukraini. Novyi pochyn videnskoho kardynala,” *Dilo*, 23 October 1933). These initiatives culminated in a conference in Vienna on December 16-17, 1933, at which Milena Rudnytska admitted that she had hoped for a stronger international response that would have immediately put an end to the famine, and was disappointed with “Europe’s silence” (Papuha, *Zakhidna* 55). The conference issued its own appeal to the international community. Ewald Ammende was particularly active at the conference and shortly afterwards issued his book *Muss Russland Hungern* (1935).

Several facts stand out concerning the coverage. The first is its relative lateness. Spontaneous mobilizations, such as initiatives taken by individual church groups, had occurred earlier and the issue of widespread famine had been raised in the Sejm, where one Ukrainian member had publicly struck a communist member (Kushniezh, “Uchast” 131, 132). The lateness is, perhaps, less surprising if one considers that the deaths from hunger peaked in June, 1933, and that most Galician and Western reports appeared in the summer of that year. A number of important works were published later, including Gareth Jones’ “Reds let Peasants Starve” (1935); William Henry Chamberlain’s *Russia’s Iron Age* (1935); Ewald Ammende’s *Muss Russland Hungern* (1935), translated as *Human life in Russia* (1936); and Eugene Lyons, *Assignment in Utopia* (1937). It should also be recalled that the Soviet press and pro-Soviet organizations such as the CPWU, were either silent about the extent of the famine or issued aggressive denials. The Soviet news agency TASS consistently attacked what it called “rumours”
and insisted that the harvest was an “unbelievable” success. It might also be pointed out that even a relatively well-informed figure like Antin Krushelnytsky, who had strong contacts with Soviet writers, seemed unaware of the famine’s scope or the nature of the terror campaign against Ukrainian intellectuals. Before leaving for Ukraine he commented: “We have survived more than one famine; it won’t last forever” (Krusheknytska 90). Cheap grain from Soviet Ukraine was being sold in Galicia, a fact that was used by the CPWU to deny the famine and to ridicule the stories of cannibalism. Some CPWU members even crossed the border illegally in order to see for themselves. The lucky ones – now no longer famine-deniers -- were arrested and sent back (Pakharenko 131-32).

In Galicia coverage of the Great Famine was almost immediately identified as an attack on Ukrainian cultural and biological survival. Many Western European observers linked the disaster to the arrests of Ukrainian oppositionists in the communist party and the crushing of the country’s cultural demands. Ammende has already been mentioned in this regard. Suzanne Bertillon in her “Famine in Ukraine […] Systematically organized, it strives to destroy the nation whose only crime is their aspiration to freedom […]” published in Le Matin on 30 August 1933 took a similar line. Implicitly, so did the pro-Soviet Louis Fischer in his Soviet Journey (1935), where he wrote:

The Bolsheviks were carrying out a major policy on which the strength and character of their regime depended. The peasants were reacting as normal human beings would. […]

In the final analysis, the 1932 famine was a concomitant of the last battle between private capitalism and socialism in Russia. The peasants wanted to destroy collectivization. The government wanted to retain collectivization. The peasants used the best means at their disposal. The government used the best means at its disposal. The government won. This argument here is also the Social Darwinian one, except that it issues from the other camp. Pro-communists were making the case that “to make an omelette one has to break eggs,” or, in
other words, that the opposition to collectivization had to be crushed whatever the cost in human lives.

Galicians and émigré Ukrainians, including dissident members of the CPWU, were all in agreement that the attacks on Ukrainianization and the famine were linked. Their argument was that Stalin was determined to destroy the roots of Ukrainian resistance to the regime, which lay in the countryside. Mykola Kovalevsky, who in 1919 had served as minister of agrarian affairs in the government of the UNR (Ukrainian People’s Republic) wrote in 1937: “The slogan of collectivization of agriculture in Ukraine was understood by the communist administration as a slogan of struggle against the largest social group of the Ukrainian people – the peasantry. The introduction of collectivization became transformed into the systematic destruction of material wealth, and when resistance was encountered into the physical destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collectivization was the reason for the complete disorganization of production and called forth local revolts of the peasantry against Soviet power. These were put down with great ruthlessness, as in an occupied country” (Kovalevsky, 126-27). He concluded that the famine “will always remain a terrible example of the clear destruction of the Ukrainian people by the Russian occupier” (128).

The focus on national survival and the fear of extinction moved the rhetoric of liberals and democrats of all stripes closer to that of the “capital N” Nationalists. Dilo, for example, on August 16 carried an article that commented: “It is not simply a case of human outrage, nor of sympathy and pity for the misfortune of someone close, a family member. It is a question of the psychic mobilization of the entire people. It is necessary that the idea should enter the blood and bone of every Ukrainian that Russia [Moskovshchyna] and communism are mortal enemies that have to be broken: communism must disappear from the face of the earth, leaving behind it the
memory of a frenzied idea and one insane experiment, and Moscow has to be confined to its ethnographic territories” (“Ves narid proty hnobyteliv!” Dilo, 16 August 1933). The biological-survivalist imagery was continued in an article by Senex, who argued that “sick” individuals need “disinfecting” from “national organism” for the latter’s “correct functioning.” The country was full of “nihilists, godless, hooligans, bandits, who have taken the form of commune-bolsheviks. But political wreckers also include Janissaries, renegades, Moscowphiles and turncoats [khruni]” (Senex, “Moralna neduha,” Dilo, 19 August 1933).

A further example of how the rhetoric shifted toward themes that the OUN was repeating is provided by an article written by a Ukrainian member of the Sejm, who expressed a sense of powerlessness and guilt when confronted with the scale of the horror. It was necessary, he wrote, to ask how this could have happened. The Soviet economic system was the main reason, but the other was “our own guilt.” Ukrainians had been unable to grasp the moment of tsarism’s collapse to win and maintain their own state because of “internationalist and materialist-socialist ideas” that had distracted them from the task at hand (S. Khrutsky, “Iak nam reaguuvaty na suchasnu tragediiu Ukrainy,” Dilo, 2 October 1933). Naturally, all commentators identified the botched project of collectivization, its mad tempo, along with the mismanagement and cruelty of the leadership as the main causes of the tragedy. However, the sense of guilt, coupled with the condemnation of a weak and confused leadership, harmonized with the OUN’s propaganda. The charge of weakness was increasingly directed by it against UNDO and the Western democracies, whose protests against the famine were seen as completely ineffective.

At this time Tselevych wrote an attack against the “mass actions” that were sanctioned by the OUN underground in Galicia and which involved “sabotage” in state schools: smashing windows, destroying Polish books, vandalizing property and physical intimidation of teachers
and students. Tselevych called for political struggle, not the child’s play of smashing windows, which would only lead to arrests, the loss of sympathy in the wider community and general demoralization (Volodymyr Tselevych, “Shkilnyi sabotazh,” *Dilo*, 11 October 1933). However, the impotence of democrats in the face of the enormous catastrophe across the border, and the inadequateness of the international response undermined their case. In some quarters the feeling of political helplessness was translated into support for terrorism. On October 21, 1933, Mykola Lemyk assassinated Alexei Mailov, an official of the Soviet consulate in Lviv, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He avoided the death penalty because he was under twenty-one years of age. The assassination had been planned by the OUN as an act of solidarity with the people of Ukraine and was announced as such. Although the government prevented the trial from being used to publicize the Great Famine, the organization nonetheless gained a great deal of publicity and many observers probably agreed that the assassination was “an appropriate response” to the tragedy across the border (Papuha, *Zakhidna* 81). *Dilo* did not condemn the assassination. It carried articles on Lemyk’s trial and reported on the OUN’s anti-Soviet activities with some degree of sympathy. Few were at the time aware that the assassination of Antin Krushelnytsky, which had also been planned for the same day as Mailov’s, was called off by the OUN only at the last moment (Papuha, *Zakhidna* 76).

The Soviet Union was recognized by the USA in December, 1933, and accepted into the League of Nations in the following September. Pressure for good relations was being put on governments by businesses who saw the potential for trade and who preferred to believe that reports of famine were exaggerated. In the end five governments voted against admitting the USSR to the League. They included Switzerland, which raised the issue of famine. Ireland, Germany and Spain also voted in the League of Nations for immediate action.
Although Dmytro Andriievsky of the OUN’s Brussels Press Bureau was active in helping the Ukrainian community publicize the Great Famine, the OUN’s publications were relatively subdued on the issue. It received little mention in the Lviv-based *Nash klych* (Our Call) or *Vistnyk* (Herald). *Nash klych* strongly criticized appeals to international bodies: “Moscow,” it wrote, “is an active and real force; it cannot be removed from Ukraine by any protests but only by the real force of revolution” (“Den borotby z bilshovyzmom,” *Nash klych*, 17 September 1933). The émigré OUN’s major response was the publication Ulas Samchuk’s *Maria* (1934).

Famine was also the subject of a play, O. Zadenna’s *Vidplata* (Payback), which was serialized in the OUN’s organ *Samostiina dumka* (Independent Thought) in 1934. This journal appeared in Chernivtsi in Romanian-ruled Bukovyna. However, the purpose of both works is to demonstrate the strength of resistance to communist ideology and the need for mass militancy. This was the standard response in Nationalist publications and explains why the OUN felt discomfort with the issue. The depiction of helplessness and victimization went against its search for images of strong, assertive behaviour; its primary message was that one must fight or die. Two articles in *Rozbudova natsii* (Building the Nation), the OUN’s main organ published in Prague, deal with Western newspaper reports of the famine. They are M., “Hodi movchaty!” 7-8 (1933): 159-61 and K. Syretskyi, “S.O.S.,” 9-10 (1933): 206-9. The first was published in the July-August issue and the second in the September-October issue. They summarize information presented in the international press and mention protests and the suppression of popular resistance. The journal preferred stories of defiance and success. Yevhen Onatsky’s article “Kult uspikhu” (Cult of Success, 1934) briefly mentioned the famine in the penultimate paragraph in order to affirm that the nation was showing “an ever more mighty spirit and refuses to put down its arms in the struggle for its national and spiritual liberation” (“Onatsky, “Kult” 169). In 1934 Oleh Olzhych,
the OUN’s cultural theorist wrote an erudite article on depictions of hunger in Ukrainian literature. He interpreted Samchuk’s famine scenes in *Maria* as “the fruit of violence by a hostile doctrine over the organic Ukrainian element” and indicated that the way forward lay in “this element’s protest and victorious uprising” (Olzhych 247). The OUN’s negative attitude toward the widespread publicity is perhaps best expressed in Onatsky’s diary entry from September 14, 1934, in which he states that the mass destruction of Ukrainians through famine and deportations had convinced the world “that Ukraine was finished, and that all its paper protests are an expression and proof of the complete powerlessness of Ukrainians, and so there is nothing left to do but to negotiate with Moscow in an attempt to tame and “domesticate” it, so as to have it, if not as a partner, then at least not as an enemy” (Onatsky, *U misti* 4 286).

Restrained reporting in later OUN publications can be explained by this need to deny powerlessness. In 1936–37 the party ideologist Volodymyr Martynets mentioned the famine briefly and incongruously in a discussion of the inadequate diet of Ukrainians. No doubt influenced by Marinetti’s futurist cookbook which urged Italians to develop their machismo by eating more meat and avoiding pasta, Martynets describes why carnivorous people resemble more aggressive nations and not impotent vegetarian ones (*travoidy* or grass-eaters). In the context of this discussion, the famine served as an embarrassing indication of weakness and degeneration (Martynets, *Za zuby* 24, 29). Partly because of greater exposure to Eastern Ukrainians who had suffered in the Holodomor, the OUN’s reporting gradually increased. In 1940, during the occupation of Galicia under the terms of the Hitler-Stalin agreement of 1939, Mykola Stsiborsky, another leading ideologist of the OUN, calculated from census figures that the Ukrainian nation had lost five million people in the Great Famine (9).
In his memoirs Ivan Kedryn (real name Rudnytsky), who in the thirties became an editor of *Dilo* but who always maintained good personal relations with Yevhen Konovalets, the leader of the OUN, and acted as the newspaper’s liaison with the latter, describes the visit of his sister Milena Rudnytska to the League of Nations without mentioning her attempts to draw attention to the Famine. He leaves the impression that her mission was purely to bring attention to the Pacification campaign and the Polish government’s attempts to assimilate Ukrainians (323-24). This omission may have been a symptom of the significant psychological shift which occurred in the wider Ukrainian society during the 1930s: it involved downplaying passivity and victimization, and simultaneously emphasizing mobilization and the need for activism.

By the late 1930s, press attention was focused on the waves of arrests in the Soviet Union and on Hitler’s political manoeuvring. Although coverage of the Famine diminished, it did not disappear. In 1937 *Dilo* reminded readers of the destruction of the Ukrainian village: “Let us remember the situation of the French press in 1933 when hunger raged in Ukraine, when millions of Ukrainians died, and the French press under Mr. Herriot’s direction wrote about the ‘good life and the paradise’ of the Soviets?” Herriot, the former French Prime Minister, had returned from a visit to the Soviet Union in 1933 and declared that there was no famine. The newspaper recalled this in 1937 on the occasion of a speech in Lviv by Carlo Agrati, an Italian journalist who had visited Ukraine in 1934. He recalled the guides who tried to prevent outsiders from seeing villages, the disorganization and filth, and the ubiquitous portraits of unsmiling Lenins and Stalins: “The Russians [Moskali] deny it but the general conviction is that the population has shrunk significantly [...]. Certainly villages have been depopulated” (“V Ukraini ‘selo staie pusteleiu’ (Vrazhinnia chuzhyntsia z podorozhi po Sovitskii Ukraini),” *Dilo*, 21 Feb 1937).
Soon, however, the partitioning of Poland in accord with the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, and the outbreak of the Second World War it provoked, dominated the press. When the Soviet Union invaded and incorporated Galicia, *Dilo* was banned and most of the UNDO leaders arrested. The OUN, which had worked as a clandestine organization and had steadily rebuilt its network since the mass arrests of 1935, was the only non-communist political organization able to continue operating, albeit underground.

In the postwar period there was little interest in the 1932-33 famine among Western commentators, many of whom saw attempts to raise the issue as a Cold War, anti-communist tactic. However, the Ukrainian press consistently explained the disaster in the way this had been done during the 1930s: as an attack on the nation. For example, in 1963 when discussing the anthology of eyewitness reports entitled *Black Deeds of the Kremlin* (1954) one commentator wrote that “the destruction of the Ukrainian village” and of the “Ukrainian national substance” had been an end in itself. “Like a tree firmly rooted in the earth, which always put forth fresh shoots, the Ukrainian village was constantly reborn after repeated hard times.” Moscow saw Ukrainians as “bourgeois nationalists” with their roots in the alien rural Ukraine. (T.V. “Holod iak zasib narodovbyvstva,” *Svoboda*, 1 August 1963). The driving force behind this need to remember the tragedy were the emigres from Eastern Ukraine, who had experienced it, in many cases, personally.

Today it is clear that Stalin micromanaged the policies that caused the Great Famine, and the rhetoric and political statements that accompanied it -- even the notorious five ears of corn law and the strict surveillance of the countryside (Davies 164). Self-deluding behaviour was required of famine-deniers, as it was of those who concocted incredible, self-contradictory charges against the hundreds of thousands caught up in waves of arrests: they had to act in front
of one another as though they believed in the fantasy. Among the more inane was the charge that Trotsky and Zinoviev were “Gestapo agents” and “sworn enemies of the working class” (Davies 336). Dilo reported that Trotsky was accused of making an agreement with Germany, which allowed the latter to take over Ukraine and install a government there (“Z zhyttia sovitskoi Ukrainy,” 27 January 1937). Stalin, who triggered campaigns of vilification, may or may not have believed his own fantasies, but he insisted that everyone else act them out. The result was a completely inadequate understanding of reality among perpetrators and observers. In 1937 Dilo reported with astonishment the mass arrests of communist party leaders, officers and administrators (“Areshtovano 1,200 sovitskykh starshyn,” Dilo, 4 Feb 1937; “GPU dali perevodyt masovi areshtuvannia,” Dilo, 7 Feb 1937). Readers were transfixed by reports of recent mass-murderers meekly confessing to long lists of fabricated charges. The trails of Piatakov and Radek were quickly followed by news of Postyshev’s arrest.

As this paper has suggested, the Great Famine was “instrumentalized” from the beginning by various political forces, each of which place its own interpretation on the event or the coverage. Already in 1933, Edouard Herriot wrote that it was a fantasy of the Germans. In the same way as the latter had invented Ukraine during the First World War, they had now invented the Famine: “those thousands of letters that arrive from various ends of the Soviet Union, that write about the starving and plead for any possible help, are all organized by Germans on Soviet territory (Dilo 1933; quoted in Babiak 134). In later decades, mention of the event was often attributed to the machinations of “Ukrainian fascists.” Douglas Tottle’s infamous Fraud, Famine and Fascism (1987) is a classic of Soviet disinformation along these lines. It deliberately links “fascism,” Ukrainian nationalism and public discussion of the tragedy in a deliberate attempt to discredit the political emigration and Western scholars involved in
researching the issue. Fifty years after the event the Soviet Union still denied the famine’s extent and preventability. Tottle’s book was part of this campaign. It praises the “integrity” of the famine-deniers Edouard Herriot and Sir John Maynard, and smears all Soviet critics. Harvard is called a “centre of anti-communist research,” Muggeridge is “a former British intelligence agent,” all emigre critics of the Soviet Union are linked to Nazi collaborators. The book calls the estimated number of victims “absurd,” but offers no figures. It concludes: “the population of Ukraine did not decline in absolute terms; between 1926 and 1939 the population increased by 3,339,000 persons” (74). In the 1980s it was convenient for Soviet apologists to make “Nationalism” the issue in order to deflect attention from the famine’s causes and extent.

The muted reaction in the West to the famine is an issue in itself. It was the result of a number of factors, including Soviet disinformation, the presence of dupes in the Western communities, diplomatic reticence, bias among historians and apologism among those who believed that “there was no other way.” Robert Conquest has suggested that an inability to admit a war against national resistance also played a role. He wrote that in the postwar period “the idea that Ukraine was a nation, that its people had national feelings, had not established itself in the West, as Polish nationhood had done” (8). In the early 1950s, Harvard University in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force conducted an oral history project which interviewed former Soviet citizens, about a third of whom were Ukrainians. Reading the transcripts of these interviews, researchers have been struck by the absence of information concerning the Famine. James Mace has explained that all the Ukrainians had stories to tell: “There were many of them, and the interviewers were not particularly interested in the famine. Notations appear in the transcripts, which still exist, that the interviewer just stopped the recorder when the respondent began talking about the famine of 1933. The person became very emotional, and the interviewer became very
sympathetic. Once they had finished with the subject, the interviewer again started asking
questions and recording” (quoted in Ibid. 19). This passage is a reminder that researchers often
search for evidence that will fit their own “horizon of expectation” or constructed narrative.

This paper has attempted to indicate the extent and nature of the coverage of the Great
Famine in the Western Ukrainian press, how the coverage was used by various political groups,
and to indicate that many topics raised during in the press coverage of the 1930s still resonate in
present-day discussions.

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"On the importance of the famine in the Western Ukrainian press see especially: Papuha, *Zakhidna Ukraina i Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv* (Lviv, 2008); M. Kuhutiak, *Holodomor 1933-ho i Zakhidna Ukraina (Trahediia Haddniprianshchyny na tli susipil. nastroiy zakhidnoukr. hromadskosti 20-30-kh rokiv)* (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2003); Kushnezh,”Uchast ukrainskoi hromadskosti Polshehi v dopomohovykh ta protestatsiinykh aktsiiakh proty holodomoru v Ukraini,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 3 (2005): 131-41, and his "Lvivska presa pro holodomor v URSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 3 (2006): 199-209; Pakharenko, V. *Viti iedynoho dereva* (Cherkasy, 2005). Zięba in his *Lobbing dla Ukrainy w Europie międzywojennej* (Kراكow, 2010) and “Pacyfikacja Małopolski Wschodniej w 1930 (1993) links the OUN’s rise to internal Ukrainian politics and the need to raise money from the Ukrainian community abroad. Recent accounts of OUN’s rise in the interwar period have been written by Motyka, *Ukraїnska*
Members and supporters of the OUN are referred to as Nationalists (capitalized), while other supporters of national independence, which included most of the Ukrainian population in Galicia and in emigration are referred to as nationalists (uncapitalized).

Vladimir J. Kisilewsky (Kysilevsky, Kaye) had spent six years in Canada and was a naturalized British subject. He was hired by Jacob Makohin to head the Ukrainian Bureau in London. Kisilewsky knew several languages and as the son of Olena Kisilewska, a Ukrainian feminist and member of the Polish Senate, was well connected. He wrote for the Lviv dailies Dilo and Novyi chas, both of which were sympathetic to UNDO. Kisilewsky established contacts with several leading British politicians and journalists like Malcolm Muggeridge and Gareth Jones. His extensive archives, including his London Diary, are housed in the National Archives, Ottawa. I wish to thank Orest Martynowych for allowing me to read his unpublished paper on “The Ukrainian Bureau in London: Diplomacy, Propaganda and Political Consolidation” and for sharing his knowledge of Kisilewsky with me.

The OUN’s relationship to the church was troubled. Ie. Liakhovych in “Tserkva i my,” Rozbudova natsii 11-12 (1932): 280-83 wrote that “the historical goals of the state always demand religious ecstasy” (280). He argued that “national feelings have all the characteristics of religious feelings” (ibid.) and that the church’s duty was to “fill itself with national content and to recognize national perfection as one element of eternal perfection” (281). Armstrong is probably correct, at least in describing the period 1929-39, when he wrote in his Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) that there remained “strong elements of liberal and democratic, as well as Christian, principles, even when the participants in the movement verbally rejected them” (23). Andrii Melnyk, who took over the OUN after the assassination of Yevhen Konovalets in 1938, had earlier been chairman of the Catholic youth organization in Galicia. The younger generation was much more anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Christian.
Although this of course represents part of the growing antisemitic discourse in Galicia during the thirties, it should also be pointed out that the perception of Jews as active in the Soviet repressive apparatus was not a fantasy. There had been a substantial number of Jewish activists within the Cheka-GPU-NKVD in Ukraine from the organization’s early years. Vadym Zolotarev in his “Nachalnyi sklad NKVS USRR” has calculated that the national composition of the top 90 people in the Ukrainian NKVD in 1936 was: 60 Jews (66.67%), 14 Russians (15.55%), 6 Ukrainians (6.67%), 3 Latvians (3.33%), 2 Belarusians (2.22%), 1 Pole (1.11%). A similar picture existed in the local organs. In the Kharkiv oblast GPU-NKVD during 1932-38 the top 44 positions were made up of 32 Jews (72.72%), 6 Russians (13.64%), 2 Ukrainians (4.55%), 2 Belorusians (4.55%), 2 Latvians (4.55%). The inability to “Ukrainianize” the Cheka appears to have been a long-standing “problem” for the party. Dzerzhinsky complained to Lenin in 1920 that “an enormous hindrance in our work is the absence of Chekists who are Ukrainians” (V.I. Lenin i VChK: Sbornik dokumentov (1917-1922 gody, Moscow, 2001, 200; quoted in ibid., 68).