The Role of Nonpermanent Members of the UN Security: A Lessons Learned Workshop

Summary of Findings

Sponsored by SSHRC, Global Affairs Canada, University of Manitoba’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies and the Royal Military College of Canada

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Executive Summary

A workshop on the Nonpermanent Members of the UNSC took place on 7 September 2018 at the Museum of Nature in Ottawa, ON. The workshop was organized by Andrea Charron (University of Manitoba) and Jane Boulden (RMC) thanks to a SSHRC connection grant and funding from Global Affairs Canada, the University of Manitoba and the RMC.

This one-day, four-panel event brought together academics, practitioners and students as well as public servants to consider the role of the elected, nonpermanent members on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to glean lessons learned to inform Canada’s 2021-2022 campaign. The four panels investigated: 1) the changing role of the UNSC since Canada last held a seat on the UNSC in 2000; 2) the roles of the ten, elected nonpermanent members generally and the election process; 3) lessons learned from other nonpermanent members; and 4) lessons learned for Canada’s campaign from former Canadian Ambassadors to the UN.

Assuming Canada is successful in its bid to hold one of two Western European and Other Group seats, the following are suggested lessons learned:

- the role of non-permanent members has been particularly important in pushing the Council, and thus the P5, to deal with the consequences of conflicts even when the Council has been unable to overcome P5 divisions to deal with the conflict itself;

- Canada may wish to consider not only what issues it wants to champion for itself, but also whether it is open to accepting the baton on any other issue that may need support as another elected member ends their term;

- the UNSC penholder system continues to be an area of P5 dominance (especially among the P3, the US, UK and France). This is an area where there may be room for pressure from nonpermanent members for greater access; and

- Nonpermanent members are making greater use of the “any other business” item in Security Council consultations as it provides an opening for non-permanent members to raise issues. However, it is important to not be overly ambitious about the nature and number of these priorities.

Suggestions to consider for Canada’s campaign include:
- start early and show interest at the highest levels of government;
- be aware that support can be fickle when the actual ballot is cast;
- campaigns have become increasing politicized;
- Africa is key to winning elections as it represents 54 of the 129 (or 2/3) required votes; and
- have a second ballot strategy in hand.
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How to think about a Security Council seat for Canada

Canada is continuing its campaign for a non-permanent seat (or one of the 10 elected seats as it is also known (E10)) on the Security Council in anticipation of a vote in mid-June 2020 for a term beginning 1 January 2021 and lasting until 31 December 2022. The Trudeau government announced its intention to run for this seat on 16 March 2016 in New York City.

Assuming Canada is successful in its goal, it will have been 20 years since it was last on the Council in 1999-2000. Using experience as a guide, what are the lessons learned from Canada’s past six terms, the experience of other states in the election process as well as what to expect once (and if) a Security Council seat is achieved?

I. The Council Context

Unpredictability

For all of the planning states undertake in anticipation of issues that will arise on the Council’s agenda, past experience demonstrates that the unpredictability of the Council agenda is itself predictable. As the Council is the primary organ of the United Nations charged with dealing with international peace and security, it deals with crises as they arise, making it difficult to anticipate in advance the types of issues and conflicts that a member may have to address during their tenure.

An examination of the unpredictable shifts in the Council’s agenda since Canada was last on the Council in 1999-2000 include:
- the events of 9/11 and the Council’s subsequent deep focus on terrorism;
- the 2011 change in the North Korean regime, and its subsequent push to step up efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, prompting significant Council action on the question of nuclear proliferation generally and North Korea’s weapons development in particular;
- the Arab Spring, beginning in 2010 with effects still ongoing.

There is also the unpredictability resulting from shifts in the leadership and/or policies of key governments, especially among the P5. These changes can have far reaching effects on the UNSC’s agenda. A recent example of this is the Trump Administration’s decision to end funding for certain UN projects and its push for changes to the UN peacekeeping.

Consistency

While unpredictability is a key watchword, some elements of the Council’s work are consistent over time. Since the end of the Cold War, the Council has demonstrated a strong desire for
consensual decision-making.\footnote{https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/January_2014_Insert.pdf} Even as dissension between Russia and the United States has affected the Council’s ability to make decisions, when decisions are made there is a strong push to ensure they are made by consensus. Between 2008 and 2017, over 90% of the total resolutions passed were passed unanimously.\footnote{Highlights of Security Council Practice 2017, p. 16.}

On occasion, for some non-permanent members, this makes decision-making easy as their own position on draft resolutions may start from a prioritization of the position of one of the permanent members. But for most non-permanent members the push for consensus necessitates a requirement to have a solid understanding of both the issue in question and the country’s position on it so to avoid being pushed into support of a decision in order to ensure a unanimous vote. By the same token, the push for unanimity can provide an opening for non-permanent members to attempt to tweak the resolution to achieve changes in support of the country’s position.

The Council also continues to be consistent in the normative role it plays in global politics especially in its focus on thematic issues. About 30% of the Council’s agenda is taken up with these kinds of issues, which in the past few years included a focus on children in armed conflict, the protection of civilians, and peacebuilding amongst a number of other issues.

Measured in meeting and resolution numbers, the Council’s work on Africa has declined from a high of about 2/3 to approximately 50% last year. But this region, along with the Middle East, remains a major focus of the Council’s work.

The Agenda is Full

All of this speaks to the fact that the Council is a busy place for member states. Even in the context of a politically difficult atmosphere among the P5, since Canada was last on the Council and in particular in the last few years, the Council’s work programme has been considerable. In 2016, the Council adopted 77 resolutions, and in 2017 it adopted 61, all with a commensurate number of public and private meetings, not to mention meetings of an ever increasing number of subsidiary bodies of the UNSC. Indeed, the latter is an area of real growth in the last 18 years. In 2018 there are 23 UNSC committees/working groups/advisory bodies.\footnote{See S/2018/2/Rev.2, 13 July 2018.}. Similarly, Security Council visiting missions have become a standard part of the Council’s work. In 2016 and 2017, five such missions occurred each year.\footnote{United Nations Security Council Affairs, Highlights of Security Council Practice. These reports are issued each year beginning in 2011. Security Council Report also tracks the Council’s work and provides an annual overview. For the most recent see: Security Council Report, In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2017. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-02/in_hindsight_the_security_council_in_2017.php} The pace of work is thus heavy for permanent and non-permanent members alike.

The Broader Political Context

One of the hallmarks of the post-Cold War Council has been new willingness of the permanent members to work together or at least to operate as a group when possible. In recent years, especially since the conflicts in Libya and Syria, that atmosphere has changed, and the division that then emerged has deepened. Even still, as indicated by the pressure for consensus in Security
Council decision-making, the permanent members are able to come together on a number of issues. In 2017, of the 68 draft resolutions considered in the UNSC, 59 were adopted unanimously. Nevertheless, the inability of the P5 to come together on central issues, such as Syria and conflict in the Middle East, has spilled over into other issues, making agreement difficult even with respect to conflicts not linked to that region. For example, the use of the veto has made a comeback with 7 vetoes cast in 2017 and 3 already cast so far in 2018. As it has been in the past the emergence of interest-driven great power politics is stymying Council decisions contributing to an erosion of perceptions of the legitimacy of the Council as a whole.

The Advantages of Permanency

Permanency is an advantage. In addition to the obvious benefits that accrue to permanent members there is also a disadvantage for elected members. One of these is the lack of institutional memory for non-permanent members. A state like Japan, which has the benefit of a frequent presence on the Council as an elected member, is at an advantage in having some institutional memory as well as the ability to return to issues it may have championed in an earlier time on the Council only a few years previously. But for most members the time between seats on the Council is too long to accrue this advantage. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that some states have limited capacity to draw on in terms of their own government resources. All of this is intensified by the fact that the P5 are known to use their political and economic clout to influence NPM votes. For some states the threat of punishment or the possibility of reward for voting a certain way may be difficult to ignore. In balancing bilateral interests with multilateral interests, bilateral interests are more likely to win out.

The other advantage of permanency for the P5 is the inherent clout this gives them in setting the agenda and in the power of their combined weight when they come together on an issue. Agenda setting, really agenda control, can come about in behind the scenes meetings when one or more of the P5 make clear that they will veto a draft resolution should it come to the table. This kind of manoeuvre is sometimes referred to as the hidden veto or pocket veto and results in an agenda item or draft resolution being put aside before it has the chance to become part of the formal Council process.

The pocket veto is a reminder of the struggle for transparency in decision-making by the UNSC. The push for greater transparency in the Council’s work in recent years is a reaction to not just the power of P5 decision-making but the fact that it often occurs out of the public realm and sometimes without consultation with non-permanent members. The call for transparency has had an unintended side effect in prompting the P5 to be even more closed to outside influences when working amongst themselves. This results in making it even more difficult for elected members to have significant input on issues. There is a balance here that has yet to be found in weighing the importance of transparency against the benefits of P5 cooperation.

II. What Role for Non-permanent members?

Although much depends on the specific countries sitting around the table, and even the personalities of delegate members, the divide among permanent members has acted as both a prompt and an opening for non-permanent members to play a greater role. In this respect the role of non-permanent members has been particularly important in pushing the Council, and thus the P5, to deal with the consequences of conflicts even when the Council has been

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5 See Annex C.
6 https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick
unable to overcome P5 divisions to deal with the conflict itself. For example, Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden have all played successful lead roles in various ways in the past few years on various humanitarian-related issues relating to Syria.

The thematic area of the Council’s work is one in which there is greater room for non-permanent member influence. For example, in the past Canada took a leading role on developing the commitment to the Protection of Civilians and this concept is now a mainstay in all Council resolutions authorizing peacekeeping operations. Other examples include Spain’s lead on the question of Women and peace and security (resulting in Security Council Resolution 2242 in 2015) and German and Luxembourg’s leadership on the question of children in armed conflict.

Japan’s frequent presence on the Council has contributed to its ability to play a significant role in maintaining and updating the Council’s working methods. While Japan’s role has been crucial, other elected members have helped keep this process moving at key moments.

These examples demonstrate the difficulties inherent in the lack of continuity inherent to issues championed by non-permanent members during their time on the Council. Unless an active effort is made to cultivate an incoming non-permanent member to commit to continuing to push the agenda item forward momentum can be lost when a member state leaves the Council. **Canada may wish to consider not only what issues it wants to champion for itself, but also whether it is open to accepting the baton on any other issue that may need support as another elected member ends their term.** This practice has become more common as members see this as an area of elected member influence as well as seeing the importance of maintaining momentum on an issue over time.

While the recently formalized penholder system continues to be an area of P5 dominance (especially among the P3, the US, UK and France), this is an area where there may be room for pressure from non-permanent members for greater access. Security Council Report’s tracking of this role demonstrates both the dominance of permanent members but also the arrival of non-permanent members to the list. Similarly, the greater use of the “any other business” item in Security Council consultations provides an opening for non-permanent members to raise issues.

The E10 don’t tend to develop a common position, or operate as a bloc, but in recent years they have established a routine of regular meetings, and sometimes these are attended by the Secretary-General or one of the Under Secretary-Generals. In recognition of the difficulties inherent in coming into a non-permanent seat more support is available for elected members than in the past. The shift in the date of non-permanent members elections from Fall to early summer also gives states more preparation time in advance of taking their seat. “Hitting the Ground Running” is an annual workshop run by the Finnish government that provides incoming members with information about current Council politics and issues as well as access to current

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Council members. In addition, incoming members begin observing the Council in October, a few months prior to their official start, a practice that gives them an opportunity to get a sense of Council politics and procedures before actually taking a seat. Capacity for nonpermanent members can be an issue for some especially as the number of resolutions adopted and committee work continues to rise. It is custom that nonpermanent members chair committees, rather than the P5, which can place additional burdens on smaller delegations. Canada, however, could manage this burden but should consider carefully which committee(s) to chair. The P5 still have considerable influence over the selection of committee chairs. Elected members can express their preferences but they don’t always get what they want. It used to be that one of the P5 (on a rotating basis each year) would take the lead in consulting with the elected members, and then the P5 would divvy up the chairmanships taking preferences into consideration but with no guarantees. Starting in 2017, there have been “two members” facilitating the process—that is, one P5 and one E10. This year the US is representing the P5 and Kuwait, as chair of the IWG on documentation, is representing the E10. Having an E10 member involved in the facilitation helps, but the P5 still have great influence, and often make sure that their proxies among the E10 chair the committees of importance to them.

III. Elections and What to Do when You’ve Won

Representation is a key tenet of the UN Charter and is reflected in the system of regional seats on the Security Council. States pursue a Council seat for a variety of reasons including for prestige, and national interests (for example – a rules based international order if that is of importance to them). Most confirm that despite the gruelling pace of work and the costs involved, being an E10 is worth it.

Canada belongs to the Western European and Other Group (WEOG) which often has very competitive races for two seats. At the time that Prime Minister Trudeau announced Canada’s candidacy for 2020, the next uncontested slot for Canada to become a nonpermanent member was 2029-2030. Rather than wait that long, Canada chose instead to compete against 3 competitors: Ireland, Norway, and San Marino, which has since bowed out.

The current WEOG election system dates from the expansion of the Security Council in 1965 and the changes to the allocation of seats by region that came about as a result of that expansion. For Canada, as well as countries like Australia and New Zealand, the loss of the Commonwealth seat that came with the expansion of the Council’s membership changed the calculus of getting on to the Security Council.

Post-council expansion Canada has been elected to the Council four times for terms spanning: 1967-68, 1977-1978, 1989-1990, 1999-2000. Canada had to compete for a seat in only the last two of those periods meaning that, including the unsuccessful Canadian campaign in 2010, Canada has been involved in three competitive campaigns for a Council seat. This reflects the

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12 Ibid., paragraph 113.

13 A good overview can be found at David Malone, “Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security Council”, Global Governance 6(1), July 2013: 3 – 23.
fact that in the last 30 years the campaigns for Council seats in the WEOG group have become more competitive and difficult.\(^\text{14}\)

Lessons learned from other states and from past Canadian campaign experiences are predictable in nature. There are no magic bullets for these campaigns. Some basic well-honed lessons include: **start early, be aware that support can be fickle when the actual ballot is cast, and have a second ballot strategy in hand.** Showing support for the state’s campaign at the highest levels is also important. For example, Sweden’s PM visited Africa three times to solicit support for their campaign.

Once on the Council, the various context factors described above underline the importance of maximizing preparation for the January start date of the Council seat.

Even while the campaign is ongoing the government is likely to be putting together a priority list of issues it wishes to pursue should it be successful in gaining a seat. Even in the preliminary stages of the campaign this may involve laying the groundwork from which these issues may be pursued. Keeping in mind the fact that the Council’s agenda is already full, and with the uncertainty about the level of discord among the P5 once (and if) Canada takes a seat, **it is important to not be overly ambitious about the nature and number of these priorities.**

Key early decisions include which committees Canada is interested in chairing, those it would accept if pressed and those it wishes to avoid. A crucial part of any non-permanent member’s approach once having secured a Council seat is cultivating relationships with the permanent representatives of the P5. Keeping them aware of Canada’s priorities, concerns and plans as well as an ongoing awareness of the P5’s own Council priorities and plans is crucial to the successful pursuit of its own priorities. As in all international relations, surprises and uncertainty are to be avoided. Similarly, it is never too soon to begin liaising with other states which will be coming off the Council as well as those which will be present when Canada joins. Once on the Council it is equally important to begin thinking ahead to incoming states at the end of the first year as the rotation in and out of states can change the tenor of the E10 group and the Council as a whole. If Canada is anticipating a push on a particular agenda item that may come to a decision in year two of its tenure, anticipating the changeover of states will be important. Prime Minister Trudeau’s biggest challenge might be that the UNSC, to which he aspires Canada become a nonpermanent member today, may not be the UNSC Canada wants to work with come 2021-2022.

The role and context of nonpermanent members or E10 (to emphasize that they and not the P5, were elected) remain an understudied element of the UNSC. Students are encouraged to consider the topic of nonpermanent members as an area rich with research potential.

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\(^{14}\) One scholar noted that other regions do not run contested elections. WEOG could adopt such a policy as well but this is likely to prove difficult to change.
**Annex 1 Regional Blocks in the UNSC in 2021-2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Declared candidacy for 2020 election for 2021-2022 term</th>
<th>Traditionally side with (US or Russia/China)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western European and Other Groups (2 members)</td>
<td>Norway, Ireland, Canada (Note San Marino had declared its candidacy as well but has subsequently pulled out)</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean Group (2 members)</td>
<td>St. Vincent and Grenadines is running unopposed in 2019 so it will be 1 other GRULAC member and Mexico</td>
<td>Depends on the representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European Group (1 member)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Russia/China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Group (2 members)</td>
<td>Afghanistan had indicated interest but withdrew. India?</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Group (3 members)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Depends on the representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Country (alters 1 member for Africa or Asia)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Depends on the representative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Canada’s Attempts and Terms on the UNSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Prime Minister in power</th>
<th>Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN</th>
<th>Other nonpermanent members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 January 1946</td>
<td>William Lyon Mackenzie King</td>
<td>Failed to be elected. Australia withdrew its candidacy after the 3rd round of voting. Australia took the seat.</td>
<td>Australia, Brazil, Poland served for 2 terms until September 1947. Egypt, Mexico, Netherlands served until September 1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1948-1949        | William Lyon Mackenzie King  
|                  | Louis St. Laurent          | General Andrew G.L. McNaughton              | 1948 Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic  
|                  |                          |                                             | 1949: Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Norway, Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic                      |
| 1958-1959        | John Diefenbaker         | Charles S.A. Ritchie                      | 1958: Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Panama Sweden  
|                  |                          |                                             | 1959: Algeria, Brazil, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Pakistan                          |
| 1967-1968        | Lester Pearson/Pierre Trudeau | George Ignatieff                         | 1967: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark Ethiopia, India, Japan Mali, Nigeria  
|                  |                          |                                             | 1968: Algeria, Brazil, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Pakistan                          |
| 1977-1978        | Pierre Elliott Trudeau   | William H. Barton                          | 1977: Benin, Germany, India, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Venezuela  
|                  |                          |                                             | 1978: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Gabon, Germany, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Venezuela |
| 1989-1990        | Brian Mulroney           | Yves Fortier                               | 1989: Algeria, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia  
<p>|                  |                          |                                             | 1990: Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen, Zaire    |
| 1999-2000        | Jean Chrétien            | Robert Fowler/Paul Heinbecker              | 1999: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Slovenia    |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Prime Minister in power</th>
<th>Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN</th>
<th>Other nonpermanent members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsuccessful campaign for 2011-2012</td>
<td>Stephen Harper (Canada withdrew after the second round of voting.) Germany and Portugal were elected</td>
<td>John McNee</td>
<td>2000: Argentina, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Netherlands, Tunisia, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012: Azerbaijan, Columbia, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Togo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Campaigning**

| 2021-2022 | ? | Competition for 2 seats in Western European and Others Group (WEOG) includes Norway and Ireland. San Marino dropped out | The only other candidate to declare their intention to run for the Asia Pacific seat is Afghanistan. |
Annex 3: A Snapshot of Past Practice of Canada on the Council

A review of votes by Canada while on the Council reveals that of the 328 calls for votes, all but 11 were “yes” or “for” the resolution drafted, which was nearly always drafted by Western-aligned states—especially the US. Canada is a strong supporter of Western-drafted texts.

Of the 11 times that Canada did not vote “yes” or “for” the resolution, five times were to vote “no.” Three of those votes were on the same topic of action in 1977, in the form of measures against South Africa. The fourth negative vote was against a resolution that condemned the US for shooting down 2 Libyan jets in 1989, and the fifth negative vote was against a resolution put forward by the nonaligned members calling on the United States to stop all military action in Panama, especially against Panamanian President Noriega. The other six non yes votes were abstentions (on issues of the admission of Vietnam, two on the Middle East, two on Southern Rhodesia and one on Cyprus).

Of the 328 opportunities Canada had to vote on the Security Council on a resolution, there are only 8 resolutions for which Canada has voted counter to or different from the vote of the US.

In the first instance, Canada voted yes for a cease-fire and establishment of a conciliation commission for Palestine in 1948 while the US, USSR and Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic all abstained. In the second case, Canada abstained on a vote to submit Vietnam as a new member of the UN while the US voted for their admission. Canada’s abstention was the only method to recuse itself from a conflict of interest as Canada was a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam; in the end the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution.

In the next four cases (3 in 1989 and 1 in 1990), the US vetoed the resolutions concerning the situation in the Arab occupied territories while Canada abstained in all cases. The next instance was an abstention by Canada to call to attention the wider bureaucratic problem with the funding of the Cypriot UN peacekeeping operation - UNFICYP. While Canada continued to support UNFICYP and was one of the main troop contributing countries, at issue for Canada was the lack of financing for the mission which, costing more than $2 billion, was borne disproportionately by troop contributing countries.

Canada, therefore drafted another resolution (S/21988 with Colombia, Finland, UK and Zaire) to investigate a new funding

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15 Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron are grateful to RMC MA candidate Alayna Jay for her diligent work in reviewing all of the resolutions.


26 See comments by Philippe Kirsch found at S/PV.2969 (14 December 1990).
formula for UNFICYP which, after revisions, was adopted unanimously as resolution 682 (1990). The final case was in 2000 when resolution 1322 was adopted on “events in Jerusalem and other areas throughout the territories occupied by Israel”. Canada voted yes while the U.S. abstained.

This voting record demonstrates that 98% of the time, Canada has voted in the same direction as the US. Further, as the US or western-aligned states are the most frequent pens (or drafters) of resolutions, Canada and its allies are “for” the action (or nonaction) prescribed the majority of time.

Where Canada has made a mark on the Council is in niche areas that pertain more to the governance function of the UNSC which tend to fall into two categories: first, initiatives that speak to the Canadian value of respect for human rights and second, to fix “machinery of government” type issues.

Canada has championed a number of thematically-based resolutions while on the UNSC. The first of many was tied to the protection of individuals adopted in its 1989-1990 term. Canada has also taken up other issues. For example, in 1989, Finland and Canada drafted a resolution condemning abduction and hostage-taking unequivocally, which was successfully adopted as a Council resolution.

Canada also co-sponsored Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, which was adopted on 31 October 2000 and contributed to a wider, but separate, effort to create an international commission resulting in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P). R2P called for states around the world to prioritize the protection of civilians with force if necessary in the case of massive abuses and loss of life either by neglect or by design as was the case in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

What is less well known or perhaps not fully appreciated is how important Canada is as a fixer of working processes and machinery of government issues. For example, it was Canada at the Council under Ambassadors Kirsch and Fortier that called for a new funding formula for one of the longest UN peacekeeping missions – UNFICYP in Cyprus. Greater UNSC transparency was at the heart of Canada’s 1998-1999 campaign, which sought to encourage more open debate, greater participation from third-party actors, better standardization of language in resolutions and clearer, more fulsome updates by member states on the actions taken to give effect to UNSC actions. Pressure from Canada and other like-minded states resulted in an agenda on transparency and the UNSC allowing non-members to participate actively in discussions. In

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1999-2000, Ambassador Fowler revolutionized how UNSC sanctions committees monitored and verified sanctions effectiveness. While not an initiative taken while on the UNSC, in 2015 Canada circulated an informal paper with regards to the Secretary-General’s selection process. The 2016 acclamation of António Guterres (Portugal) as UN Secretary-General reflected several of these recommendations. Canada has a reputation for competent, hardworking bureaucrats both in the UNSC and other international organizations (for example Philippe Kirsch’s work at the ICC).

Annex 4: UNSC between 2007 and 2017

The Security Council’s membership in 2017 consisted of the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 10 non-permanent members (Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine and Uruguay). The following table summarizes the activity of the Security Council for the year 2017 and compares it with the previous 10 years.\(^{36}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Meetings</th>
<th>Resolutions considered</th>
<th>Resolutions adopted</th>
<th>Presidential Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In 2017 the UNSC was heavily engaged in efforts to resolve conflicts and to give direction to the UN peacekeeping missions. Much of the UNSC’s attention continued to focus on Africa and the Middle East, especially Syria. Of the 68 draft resolutions considered in the UNSC for 2017, 59 were adopted unanimously, 2 were adopted with abstentions (including both Russia and China) and seven were defeated. Of the seven defeated resolutions, 4 were vetoed by Russia and one vetoed by Russia and China,1 vetoed by the U.S. and 1 failed to obtain the required number of votes (nine affirmative votes and no negative vote by a P5 member are necessary to adopt a resolution). All seven defeated resolutions were about the “situation in the Middle East” related either to Syria or to the Palestinian question. None of the UNSC members were absent for any vote in 2017.

\(^{36}\) See [https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281458.pdf](https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281458.pdf)
Annex 5: Western European and Other Group Members
(For a list of all of the regional groups, see http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml)

Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

- Andorra
- Australia
- Austria
- Belgium
- Canada
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Israel*
- Italy
- Liechtenstein
- Luxembourg
- Malta
- Monaco
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Portugal
- San Marino
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Turkey*
- United Kingdom
- United States of America*

*Turkey
Turkey participates fully in both WEOG and Asian Group, but for electoral purposes is considered a member of WEOG only.

*United States of America
The United States of America is not a member of any regional group but attends meetings of the Western Europe and Other States Group (WEOG) as an observer and is considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes.